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1 Introduction  
Against the backdrop of the continuous European ‘crises’ that have accompanied the 
European project through much of the early 21st century, the policy-making and 
academic attention to alternative modes of economic production has increased. For 
instance, in the summer of 2017 the European Economy and Social Committee, 
representing organised interests and civil society, gathered social economy 
representatives in Brussels and called for the European Commission to include an action 
plan on how to support the social economy in its 2018 work programme1 and thereby to 
contribute to government efforts in European countries to draw in the non-governmental 
actors, for instance, the ”provision and governance of publicly financed welfare 
services” (Defourny, Hulgård and Pestoff 2014:5). Around the same time, an 
international conference on social entrepreneurship drew 350 participants from 41 
countries around the world to debate the meaning and implications of the social and 
solidarity economy and social entrepreneurship from a scholarly perspective.2  
Hungary is not unaffected by this international and European policy and practice 
discourse around the social economy, while its own discourse and public debate around 
what constitutes a ‘legitimate’ civil society has significant implications for how it can 
be interpreted in the Hungarian context. At the same time, ‘Europe’ will be affected by 
how the term and policy around ‘social economy’ catches on in Hungary and other 
Central and Eastern European member states. However, there is little English-language 
material available that depicts civil society and the social economy in Hungary within 
its policy landscape, and that sets it in a longer historical perspective.  
The purpose of this paper is therefore primarily to provide such an account, in order to 
spur academic and policy interest in developments in the – nowadays – not so new 
member states. We argue that while the development of civil society has been 
impressive in terms of the growing number and diversity of organisations and their 
professional endeavours, its influence has remained limited on policy making. At the 
same time, an increased involvement of civil society organisations in public service 
provisions has produced a blurring of the boundaries between the civil and the public 
spheres that, in turn, has induced some fading away of the democratic potentials of the 
civil society field. Therefore, economic acts based on solidarity and originating from 
civil society do not automatically form or increase a ‘social economy’ but become as 
contested by and as intermingled with political developments as other acts of civil 
society. Following Eschweiler et al. (2017), by ‘the social and solidarity economy’ we 
refer to “a broad range of citizen-based activities, ranging from fair trade, renewable 
energies, microfinance and social currencies to third sector organisations providing 
                                                 
1 European Economic and Social Committee, June 28, 2017. Press Release: The EESC calls for a long-term action plan 
for the Social Economy by 2018 available at http://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/news-media/press-releases/eesc-calls-
long-term-action-plan-social-economy-2018 <retrieved September 18, 2017>. 
2 EMES International Research Group on Social Entrepreneurship. June 22, 2017. News item: Non-OECD countries 
participants on 6th EMES Conference available at http://emes.net/news/non-oecd-countries-participants-6th-emes-
conference/ <retrieved September 18, 2017>. 
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health care, social services or work integration” (Eschweiler et al 2017, drawing on 
Defourny 2001). 
This study grew out from the authors’ research within the larger framework of the 
project Solidarity in European societies: empowerment, social justice and citizenship 
(SOLIDUS)3 . The project conceptually and empirically explores current and future 
expressions of European solidarity from an inter-disciplinary approach. The paper is 
based on desktop research carried out in spring 2017 with relation to how solidarity can 
be channelled into social innovation and co-creation of public goods, i.e. into the social 
and solidarity economy, through involvement of the ‘third sector’. The focus is on 
involvement in the areas of education, employment, housing, and health. Being 
important and influential areas of civil action for tackling fundamental needs of large 
social groups all over the place, these were the sites of inquiry for the larger project. As 
for Hungary, this selection proved useful for additional purposes. While NGOs working 
in education and health deserve attention for their weight (these entities represented 
some 20 per cent out of civil society organisations registered in 2015, HCSO 2015), 
inquiring into the very few NGOs that exist within housing and employment gave us 
insights into some shortage-ridden areas, as well as into the particular constraints of 
scarcity and underfinancing in civil actions.  
The paper is structured as follows. We start by providing basic information and 
numbers on civil society in general (section 1.1.) and the social economy, in particular 
(section 1.2.). We then move to an in-depth analysis of the policy environment of civil 
society (section 2) in general, and social innovation and social economy, in particular 
(section 3).  
1.1 Size and scope of civil society  
The legal groundwork for the operation of civil society organiszations upon which 
current regulations were built was initiated by legislation already in 1987, i.e. before the 
dramatic changes that swept through Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. This was 
followed by legislation in 1997 (Török 2005) which has since then been updated several 
times. Substantial revisions were for instance introduced in 20114 and new modified 
legislation for civil society organisations receiving financial support from abroad was 
approved by parliament in spring 2017. 5  While the policy environment will be 
elaborated on in Chapter 2, it is important to note here that after an initial phase of great 
variation in the management form and financing of the emerging organisations, it 
seemed necessary to introduce clear regulations (Arapovics 2011) by, for instance, 
defining what is and what is not a ‘civil society organisation’. Thus, according to the 
                                                 
3 Funded by the European Union under the Horizon 2020 Programme (Grant Agreement nº 649489), running June 
2015 through May 2018, website <http://solidush2020.eu>.   
4 CLXXV. Law on the Right to Association and the Functioning and Support of the Civil Organisations (2011). Act 75.  
5 LXXVI. Law on the Transparency of Organisations Supported from Abroad (2017).  
CPS Working Paper  
 
  
   
6 
2011 Act, civil society organisations can take three forms: civil companionship (civil 
társaság), association (egyesület) or foundation (alapítvány). The difference between 
them concern for instance the aim of the activities conducted by the civil society 
organisations; foundations should be for some public benefit purpose whereas 
associations may be started for the benefit of the members only.  
At the same time, the overall number of NGOs, however they have been defined, show 
an increasing trend. For instance, even if the number of foundations has decreased 
somewhat since 2005, this is partly due to fusions while by taking into account also the 
membership organisations the data indicate a steady rise (see Table 1). It can be noted 
that the spatial distribution of civil society organisations has been stable. While 
Budapest is overrepresented in relation to its population (1.7 out of 10 million 
inhabitants), this overrepresentation is not dramatic, as can be seen by, for instance, 
comparing the distributions in 2005 and 2015 in Table 1. Thus, with an equal 
distribution, Budapest would have 17 per cent of foundations and membership 
organisations; instead, in 2015 it was home to 27.2 per cent of foundations and 21.1 per 
cent of membership organisations. That number is, however, slightly lower than ten 
years earlier. The same trend can be seen for regional administrative seats, whereas the 
share of foundations and NGOs active in smaller towns has slightly increased. The 
share of foundations and NGOs in villages is stable. In 2015, more than a quarter (27.8 
per cent) were active in rural settings, which due to the fragmented local government 
system to provide partnership include many settlements holding just a few hundred 
inhabitants.  
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Table 1 Overall number and spatial distribution of nonprofit organisations by type 
Community 
types 
Foundations 
Membership 
organisations* 
Total 
number 
distribution
, % 
number 
distribution
, % 
number share, % 
2005 
Capital 6 596 29,6 7 682 22,3 14 278 25,2 
County seats 5 053 22,7 7 483 21,7 12 536 22,1 
Other towns 6 363 28,6 9 685 28,2 16 048 28,3 
Villages 4 243 19,1 9 589 27,8 13 832 24,4 
Total 22 255 100,0 34 439 100,0 56 694 100,0 
2015 
Capital 5 734 27,2 8 673 21,1 14 407 23,2 
County seats 4 649 22,1 8 204 20,0 12 853 20,7 
Other towns 6 502 30,9 12 817 31,1 19 319 31,0 
Villages 4 159 19,8 11 414 27,8 15 573 25,1 
Total 21 044 100,0 41 108 100,0 62 152 100,0 
 
Source: HCSO, 2016A  
*In Hungarian társas nonprofit szervezetek. In addition to ‘associations’ (egyesületek), this can cover 
other membership organisations such as ’civil communities’ (civil társaság). 
  
 
The organisations span over broad areas of activities and policy sectors. Table 2 
provides the distribution of activity in 2015, as defined by the classification used also 
for EU-reporting by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office.  
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Table 2 Number, distribution and total revenues of nonprofit organisations by fields of activity 
  Total Distribution by 
overall revenue,  
% 
Revenue per 
organisation, thousand 
HUF   number share, % 
Culture 8,830 14.2 13.4 23,455 
Religion 1,151 1.9 0.4 5,298 
Sport 8,865 14.3 11.6 20,202 
Recreation and hobby 9,839 15.7 3.9 6,168 
Education 8,173 13.2 8.9 16,738 
Research 1,377 2.2 5.0 56,411 
Health care 2,730 4.4 4.7 26,385 
Social services 5,641 9.1 8.4 22,927 
Emergency and relief 856 1.4 0.4 7,308 
Environment 
protection 2,112 3.4 5.1 37,153 
Community 
development 3,438 5.5 17.4 78,211 
Economic 
development 1,590 2.6 9.0 87,506 
Protection of rights 667 1.1 1.1 25,818 
Protection of public 
safety 2,120 3.4 0.5 3,509 
Multipurpose 
grantmaking, support 210 0.3 0.3 24,186 
International relations 763 1.2 0.7 13,333 
Professional, 
economic advocacy 3,432 5.5 8.9 40,127 
Politics 358 0.6 0.3 11,605 
Total 62,152 100.0 100.0 24,832 
 
Source: HCSO, 2016B 
 
As it is shown in Table 2, civil society organisations are rather concentrated by their 
activity. Culture, sports and recreation together make up 44 per cent among them. In 
addition, education represents 13 per cent mostly with the foundations adjacent to 
schools. All other fields attract just a few organisations, however, sometimes these can 
provide important additions to public services like the financial data show in the case of 
organisations engaged in community development. However, it should be noted that 
most of the organisations are small in terms of financial activity. Most have yearly 
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revenues of between 51,000 and 5,000 000 HUF, i.e. approximately 160 – 16,000 Euros 
(Hungarian Statistical Office, 2016C). Chapter 2 will discuss the opportunities of civil 
society to receive part of the state’s tax income, and the development of this over time. 
However, civil society also acts as donors, and over the past ten years the provided 
amount has increased, as it can be seen in Table 3. The table shows a gradual 
institutionalisation as well: most of the support targets organisations with increasing 
magnitude in cash, while financial donations to individuals have been declining and in 
kind support has been relatively growing among the forms of support.  
Table 3 Donations of donor organisations 
Form of donation  Allocated funding – 
amount, million 
HUF 
Equivalence in EUR 
(with 2017 exchange 
rate) 
2005 
Monetary funding  
For Individuals 33,234 106,296,282 
For Organisations 86,531 276,751,702 
Total 119,765 383,043,852 
Allocated total funding (monetary and in kind)  
For Individuals 36,707 117,399,830 
For Organisations 91,028 291,134,436 
Total 127,735 408,534,267 
2015  
Monetary funding  
For Individuals 26,986 86,309,200 
For Organisations 119,599 382,512,935 
Total 146,586 468,825,334 
Allocated total funding (monetary and in kind)  
For Individuals 39,127 125,139,705 
For Organisations 124,974 399,703,773 
Total 164,101 524,843,478 
 
Source: HCSO, 2016D (authors’ conversion into EUR) 
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1.2 Size and scope of the social economy  
If solidarity economy is defined in demanding terms of where collaboration between 
public institutions and the third sector is institutionalized and integrated into the public 
governance framework (Gaiger 2015), some would question if there is any social 
economy in Hungary at all. However, the scale and scope of the social and solidarity 
economy can also be approached from an act- and/or actor-centred perspective. Who is 
conducting acts that can be seen as being part of the social economy? Such analyses 
would usually look at the community (civil sector, including households and families) 
that we have done above, but also at the ‘market’ (the private sector, i.e. private firms), 
and how they interact with the state. The questions asked within such a framework 
include: ‘Are firms carrying out social economy acts?’, ‘And if so, how?’ This can be 
investigated as acts by ‘regular firms’, usually referred to as done upon their sense of 
‘corporate social responsibility’. One can also investigate the extent to which there are 
opportunities to pursue solidarity economy within legal entities set up specifically for 
this purpose.  
In general, in line with the growth in number of civil society organisations, their share 
or contribution to the Hungarian economy has grown, but as pointed out by Kákai and 
Sebestény (2012), the heavy and increasing reliance on public funds, as well as 
important regional variations should be taken into account in the analyses.  
As concluded by a 2014 overview of social enterprises commissioned by the European 
Commission, Hungarian social enterprises typically come from one of the following 
four categories: NGOs with economic activities, traditional cooperatives with some 
social functions, social cooperatives, and private companies with social aims (European 
Commission 2014:10). Private companies can then be set up as regular companies but 
not run with the sole intention to create profit for gain. Here innovative combinations 
can be found, such as when a local/organic food distributor sets up a business arm (a 
firm) together with a non-profit organisation to realise its aims (Eschweiler et al. 2017). 
However, since there is no specific social enterprise format for firms (European 
Commission 2014:10), such activities cannot be captured by regular statistics, as will be 
elaborated on below. 
A study by Frey, published in the Social economy handbook (2006) conducted an 
overview of those non-profit organisations that had as explicit aim to stimulate 
employment and concluded that: “This number is not big, in fact, one would not 
exaggerate too much if one said these would only be a handful if we would add the self-
sustaining ability as well” (own translation from the original Hungarian) (Frey et al. 
2006:50). On the other hand, a recent (2015) report on the social economy in the 
European Union had a broader perspective on what can be included in the social 
economy and estimated that as much as 5.3 per cent out of the total number of 
employees worked for the social economy in the years 2006-2010 (for which period the 
authors had data for Hungary) and this ratio places the country somewhat below the 
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EU-27 average of 6.53 per cent (Monzon and Chaves Ávila 2015:48). The total number 
of workers were around 180,000 and was calculated by adding up the employees of 
cooperatives, mutual societies and all associations and foundations (Monzon and 
Chaves Ávila 2015:59). It should be noted that the notion of mutual societies in this 
research refers to mutual insurance companies, whose claims to being social 
organisations may be dubious. However, the only Hungarian member of the 
International Cooperation and Mutual Insurance Federation 6 , the Central European 
Insurance Society (Közép-európai Kölcsönös Biztosító Egyesület Magyarország – 
KÖBE), highlights its non-profit and Hungarian status as pitted against foreign profit-
making insurance companies.7 
In practice this means that, for instance, an administrative employee working for a 
football club will be counted as belonging to the social economy. Table 2 in Section 1.2 
provided a categorisation of non-profit organisations based on main activities. The 
organisations together make up the core of ‘civil society’ and, following the definition 
by Monzon and Chaves Ávila in their report to the European Commission, all of these 
would be included in the social economy. However, a more narrow definition of social 
economy would concentrate on just a few of these, like the social services, community 
development and emergency relief. For instance, the table shows that there are 5,600 
organisations primarily active within social services, and 3,400 within community 
development. It should also be noted that the financial stakes are low. The combined 
income of all social service organisations is about 130,000 million HUF (approximately 
4.2 million Euro). It is worth mentioning in this context that the Monzon and Chaves 
Ávila report acknowledges the enormous challenges in collecting comparable data 
across European countries, since the notion of social economy is relatively new to 
national statistical offices and does not follow traditional ways of sorting production in 
each country. The number should therefore not be understood as one set in stone, but 
gives a hint about how Hungary stands in relation to other countries (Monzon and 
Chaves Ávila 2015:21).  
Of interest to this study are cooperatives, enabled through the 2006 legislation8 referring 
to them as ‘social association’. (The term gives a hint to how they are existing in 
Hungary as a hybrid between cooperatives in the economic sense and ‘associations’ in 
the sense of ‘civil’). While there was previous legislation in the area, the new legal form 
nonetheless serves as a reference point for debate. According to the law, social 
cooperatives “have as their aim the creation and provision of work to members in 
disadvantaged position, and the improvement of social place in other way” (own 
translation). The law was initially slow in getting uptake. A thorough 2010 evaluation 
(Petheő et al. 2010) had tremendous difficulties to find, access and solicit responses 
from social cooperatives. At the time there were 116 social cooperatives in Hungary, 
and when a random sample of 20 was approached, only a few responded to repeated 
                                                 
6 See the website of ICMIF, the International Cooperation and Mutual Insurance Federation at 
https://www.icmif.org/member-organisations <retrieved June 1, 2017) 
7 See information in English about  the Central European Insurance Society at 
https://www.kobe.hu/kobewww/aboutus/kobe <retrieved June 1, 2017>  
8 Law on Associations. 2006. Act 10, Third chapter, third section.  
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mail and phone efforts, and several turned out to be defunct. The evaluators therefore 
had to go significantly beyond the initial sample in order to gather meaningful data, and 
estimated, based on their successful inquiries, that only about 60 social cooperatives 
were actually active (Petheő et al. 2010: 110). Among these, activities were diverse but 
focused on business-to-customer economic models, instead of, for instance, business-to-
business relations (Petheő et al. 2010: 118). They shared as primary aim of their 
activities to create workplaces for marginalised groups. The research also showed that 
the social cooperatives suffered from being an unknown form and that they had 
difficulties accessing the material and dialogic support they wanted from the public 
sector that they saw as their main partner (Petheő et al. 2010: 124-130).  
However, since then the social cooperatives seem to have increased in popularity –
although publicly available statistics is contradictory. A 2016 study identified 587 social 
cooperatives in 2015 (Edmiston 2016:71), whereas recent press coverage on the 
‘lavishness’ of funds going to social cooperatives cites figures closer to 2,000.9  
The field of social cooperatives has not only expanded rapidly, it has also seen changes 
in terms of active actors. It is telling that among the five organisations listed as key 
umbrella and coordinating organisations for social cooperatives in the employment area 
in the evaluation in 2010, only two seem to be active today based on updates on 
websites and references by other organisations. These are, as follows: 
 The National Association of Social Cooperatives (Szociális Szövetekezetek 
Országos Szövetsége, SzöSzöv) is an umbrella organisation to share knowledge 
of and about social cooperatives, and advocates for their status in various 
programmes. The association is an important platform but has modest resources. 
According to the latest account available on their website, their income and 
expenditure were only 600,000 HUF, less than 2,000 EUR, in 2014.  
 The National Foundation of Employment (Országos Foglalkoztatási 
Közalapitvány, OFA) was instrumental in the early stages of providing advice 
and know-how on how social cooperatives could contribute in this area, but 
seems to have lost in relative importance since.  
The most likely explanation for the increase in number of social cooperatives is that 
they have become important vehicles for the distribution of EU funds. Edmiston et al. 
writes that “social co-operatives are publicly supported through a range of regulatory 
provisions and funding instruments as a policy tool to create ‘employment 
opportunities’” (Edmiston et al. 2016:80). While this may be suitable on some levels it 
also makes the grantees vulnerable to criticism of being ‘grant-hunters’ or being 
submerged into EU discourses of job-creation rather than spreading democratic 
principles. This criticism has been raised in reports reviewed by the project team (Frey 
et al. 2006, Petheő et al. 2010, and Edmiston et al. 2016). For instance, Edmiston et al. 
argue that the social economy and its public utility is conceived “as a vehicle through 
                                                 
9 Milliárdokat szakítanak a szociális szövetkezetek. 2016. augusztus 22. <Millions for the social cooperaratives”, 
available on the economic online portal http://www.piacesprofit.hu/kkv_cegblog/milliardokat-szakitanak-a-szocialis-
szovetkezetek/ <Retrieved May 17, 2017>. The cited source is firm register which only release data against payment.  
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which to achieve pre-defined policy objectives”, primarily the reintegration of 
disadvantaged populations into the labour market and tackling unemployment 
(Edmiston et al. 2016: 75). There has also been at least one instance of serious suspicion 
of corruption. In 2016 a police investigation was launched against one of the MPs of the 
ruling party (FIDESZ). According to the investigators, he may have promised social 
cooperatives access to EU funding on the condition of receiving up to 90 per cent of the 
funding in return. Charges were pressed by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office in April 
2017.10  
While the overall number has increased rapidly, the social cooperatives are typically 
small in size. According to Edmiston et al., most would have between 7 and 10 
members, and mostly very few or no employees (Edmiston et al. 2016: 77). There have 
also been important developments in the legal framework which impacts who these 
members are. Changes in 2013 of the 2006 Act X on Cooperatives made it possible for 
local governments to be members, and additional modifications in 2016 made it 
mandatory to have local governments as members. This was criticised by the National 
Association of Social Cooperatives that also sees the new law as unclear on many 
points.11 As noted by Edmiston et al. in their case study of Hungary, the “introduction 
of local governments also propagates asymmetrical power relations that distort the co-
operative and democratic principles underpinning the effective operation of social co-
operatives” (Edmiston et al. 2016:82).  
 
2 The policy environment of civil society organisations in Hungary: a 
contextualisation based on time and space  
2.1 National strategies on working with civil society 
In order to draw a meaningful picture about the broader political and policy 
environment of civil society and its organisations in contemporary Hungary, one briefly 
has to go back in time to the late 1980s. This period preceding the systemic changes of 
the 1990s was a phase of vivid and widespread participation of Hungarian society in 
informal economic, cultural, and social activities that were primarily driven by needs 
that the socialist economy was unable to fulfil but that also were fed by a widely shared, 
tacit opposition to the ruling state-socialist state. Even though prior to the enactment of 
                                                 
10 See articles at the news portals Index and 444.hu: The corrupt FIDESZ politician wanted to get hundreds of millions 
of EU support (title translated from Hungarian) , available in Hungarian at 
http://index.hu/gazdasag/2016/08/04/szazmillios_unios_tamogatast_akart_lenyulni_a_korrupt_fideszes_kepviselo/ 
(retrieved May 22, 2017) and Charges Pressed against Mengyi Roland (title translated from Hungarian) 
https://444.hu/2017/04/25/vadat-emeltek-mengyi-voldemort-roland-ellen <retrieved May 22, 2017).  
11 National Association of Social Cooperatives website news. See http://www.szoszov.hu/megkuldte-a-
nemzetgazdasagi-miniszterium-a-2016-evi-cxlv-torveny-34-ss-1-altal-modositott-2006-evi-x  and 
http://www.szoszov.hu/sites/default/files/letoltheto/12732tvmodosas2016okt.pdf <Retrieved May 22, 2017 
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the 1989 Act on the Right for Associating12 independent associations and organisations 
could not be freely formed, thousands and thousands of spontaneously organised 
informal units existed. In a large part, these were called into being to countervail the 
deficiencies of the prevailing shortage economy: parents united to renovate their 
children’s school that had been chronically underfunded for such purposes; relatives of 
hospitalised patients organised themselves to improve the conditions in run-down and 
impoverished hospital wards by organising cooking and delivering meals and also by 
providing medicines that were inaccessible through the underfinanced system of formal 
distribution; local cultural centres enjoyed the informally organised help (finances and 
voluntary work) of engaged residents, etc. Likewise, informal cooperation and 
voluntary work assisted the functioning of local agricultural cooperatives or smaller 
firms – all under tight central control in their formal functioning. Beside the immediate 
contribution in material terms, such a rich and extensive civil participation and self-
organisation contributed to the spreading of formerly practically non-existent 
knowledge and skills: through their experience, people learned the rules of fair and just 
cooperation, the basics of democratic decision-making, and also the fundaments of 
economic management in order to effectively and rationally support the fulfilment of 
certain collective goals.  
The accumulated experience richly paid off after the regime change. By acknowledging 
the constitutional right for free association and by providing a new legal framework for 
the foundation and working of civil society organisations, the new regime gave way to 
turn the earlier semi-illegal, informal associations into proper, formally acknowledged 
units that enjoy the rights to define their own goals and choose the bases and forms of 
funding according to the participants’ will and that fit into the larger-scale system of a 
regulated market economy. Popularity is reflected in numbers: as of 1993, there were 
35,000 registered non-profit organisations (associations, foundations, and the so-called 
companionship organisations together); their number grew to 48,000 by 1997 with 
further continuous growth throughout the decade following the millennium, and 
reaching a stabilised number, as seen above, around 62,000 by the mid-2010s 
(Hungarian Central Statistical Office 1997, 2016, Bocz 2009).13 
However, these figures of dynamic growth in numbers have to be read with certain 
reservation. While widespread popular will to participate in the newly legalised civil 
sphere has certainly been one of the drivers, economic and political interests also have 
played a massive role. As we discuss it in more details below, in simultaneity with the 
legal and financial stabilisation of the NGO-sector, the subsequent governments and a 
great number of the municipalities have discovered the advantages of ‘outsourcing’ 
certain public duties by contracting with nationwide, regional or local NGOs for 
cooperating in their fulfilment. Furthermore, utilisation of the European Structural and 
Cohesion Funds that became accessible for the country after the EU-accession in 2004 
also gave impetus to the foundation of national and regional NGOs that have been 
                                                 
12 The denial of individual and collective rights for associating belonged to the very essence of the old socialist system 
that , up until the last minutes of its existence, exerted over-centralised control above all civil initiatives.   
13 The quoted numbers refer to the NGOs actively functioning in the respective years. The statistics do not present 
the overall number of the registered civil organisations. However, the latest detailed account of HCSO reports a 
gradual yearly decline in numbers, income and employment since the mid-2000s (HCSO 2015) 
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working under tight control of the founding authorities but that, due to their simpler 
managerial structure, helped to make the distribution of targeted welfare and 
community funding better targeted and more efficient.   
These recent developments had ambiguous impacts. While, in a long-term perspective, 
the flow of funding into the NGO-sector certainly has been on a steady rise14, the sector 
paid for this by losing independence and by becoming directly influenced by political 
interests and the prevailing power relations both at the parliamentary and central 
governmental level, and at the level of the local government. The shift in the 
composition of the sector from citizens-founded NGOs toward ones called into being 
and controlled by the authorities –and to a certain degree, also by for-profit enterprises – 
for assisting the fulfilment of certain public policy and/or business needs has led to the 
blurring of the boundaries between the civil and the administrative/economic spheres, 
and this way opened the gate to corruption and significantly decreased transparency of 
financing and economising.  
Amid these circumstances, it cannot be considered incidental that the subsequent 
governments and parliaments have ‘forgotten’ to develop a coherent and all-embracing 
strategy to frame the clear and distinct roles of the NGOs and to adjust the ways and 
forms of public control above them to their acknowledged independence. Instead, 
certain functions of the civil society organisations have been enlisted in task-oriented 
strategic documents on important social issues like poverty reduction, environmental 
protection, crime prevention or struggles against drug abuse. At the same time, local 
governments proved more willing to see cooperation with the local NGOs as part of 
their mid-term plans that they often formulate in strategic documents. The two 
concurrent trends of melting the civil sphere in public policy on the governmental level 
and of seeing it as an ingrained part of fulfilling local tasks on the municipal level have 
led to a high degree of fragmentation and, also to a sharp decrease in transparency and 
accountability. Amid these conditions it is not a surprise that trust in the civil society 
organisations has become shaken and especially the work of larger, nationwide 
foundations has become surrounded with suspicion and disbelief (Világgazdaság 2017).  
Nevertheless, the trends are not as bad if one looks at the data on a relatively new form 
of civil participation, the offering of a part of one’s personal income tax for supporting a 
freely chosen NGO. Since 1996, tax-paying individuals have the right to designate 1 per 
cent of their annual income tax to a selected NGO from among those that are entitled to 
receive such donations. Entitlement is bound to legally and financially proper 
functioning over five years and an uninterrupted fulfilment of the organisation’s basic 
tasks during two preceding years. The list of the entitled organisations is published each 
year by the tax authorities. As the latest data of the National Taxation Authority show 
for 2015, some 45 per cent of the registered civil society organisations met the 
requirements, while somewhat more than half of the tax-paying citizens offered their 1 
per cent to one of them, and this way raised the funding of the sphere by 83 billion HUF 
                                                 
14 The long-term trend did not break even in the years of the economic crisis, though for some years, there has been 
a slight decline followed by a period when the rate of increase has been slower than before. After a recovery in 2014, 
the current real value of the sector’s yearly overall income represents some 160 per cent of the corresponding value 
in 1993 (HCSO 2015). 
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(280 million EUR). These latest data come after a steady increase in the number of 
individuals making a declaration (see Kuti and Czike 2005 and Kuti 2008 for thorough 
analyses of the early years with this policy), while, due to the combined effects of the 
lasting economic crisis and the introduction of a flat-rate personal income tax that 
caused a drop in the transfers of the richest group of the taxpayers, the overall sums 
have slightly decreased. Nevertheless, expanding participation indicates widespread 
interest of the citizenry. Despite the known controversies and frequent criticism about 
the inefficient functioning of the civil sphere, people consider it important to maintain 
and support the civil society organisations as the representatives of public interest and 
as embodiments of independent decision-making in the conditions of ever tighter and 
centralised governance in contemporary Hungary.     
All in all, one can establish that, due to the in-built limitations on its autonomy, the 
NGO-sector has made but a modest contribution to the institutionalisation of everyday 
democratic participation while, at the same time, it also has become a significant actor 
of central and local level public service provisions. Additionally, the recent 
developments in the sector expanded the government’s scope of manoeuvring for 
expressing direct political influence and thereby taking agency over the selection among 
‘desirable’ and ‘less desirable’ organisations. The latter tendency seems to be 
strengthened by a recently enacted law15 which is a new addition to the 2011 law that 
governs the functioning of the civil sphere16. The new modification intends to draw 
under tight governmental supervision those NGOs that enjoy some significant financial 
support from abroad. The reasoning of the government represents a new approach in 
dividing up the sphere: it is stated with a good deal of hostility that NGOs enjoying 
external financial support might pose high risks for national security, since ‘alien 
agents’ might use the support for meeting ‘dangerous political goals’. This new 
approach openly goes against the independence and freedom of the civil sphere and it 
implies a potential threat also for those organisations that are currently out of the 
targeted circle.  
2.2 Policy incentives of working with civil society in selected policy areas  
As indicated above, the first years of the transformation of a centrally organised state-
socialist system to a democratic market-based society and economy were characterised 
by a rather enthusiastic orientation toward civil society and its organisations as the 
embodiments of freedom, free choice and self-regulation. The programs of the Antall- 
and Boross governments of the early 1990s emphasised these qualities (Brachinger 
2016). However, public policy interest has gradually shifted toward seeing these 
organisations primarily in their capacity of adding work and finances to the chronically 
underfinanced public social services, and the gradually introduced administrative and 
                                                 
15 LXXVI Law on Transparency of Organisations Enjoying Support from Abroad (2017). 
16 CLXXV. Law on the Right to Association and the Functioning and Support of the Civil Organisations (2011). 
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financial regulations have reflected such a reordering of the priorities (see the 2011 Law 
on civil organisations and the additions of 2017). While the classification of the civil 
society organisations distinguished them by the level of their public benefit and while 
the related regulations on their finances were purposefully adjusted, the actual social, 
economic, and cultural functions of the civil sphere never have been outlined in any 
governmental documents. Rather, such official documents have been drafted for 
meeting bureaucratic needs by setting up the administrative framework and the forms of 
coordinated decision-making in civil affairs. As stated above, strategic thinking is more 
characteristic on the local level. However, the hundreds of local civil society strategies 
result in a great deal of fragmentation both in the aims of and in the actual forms of 
cooperation.  
Given this framework one faces limitations when talking about national policies and 
specifically designed policy incentives that target one or another area of the civil sphere. 
In order to show the ambiguities resulting from the concurrent over- and under-
regulation of the civil partners and their sometimes shaky relationship with the public 
domain, in what follows we draw on examples from the selected areas of education, 
health, housing, and employment.  
Of course, civil associations and foundations exist in all four selected large areas of 
activity (though, as we discuss below, with highly differential scope and coverage), they 
were created due to institutional needs and interests in the diverse public service areas. 
Statistical data provide only aggregate information. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the 
yearly publications of the HCSO reflect a rather settled and stabilised situation: the 
distribution by profile shows that some one-third of the registered civil society 
organisations work in education, followed by 16 per cent in welfare services and a 
further 15 per cent in the cultural field. Organisations in healthcare represent some 7 per 
cent of the civil sphere, while employment and housing do not appear in the 
publications: the latter two areas attract civil activities only in a few exceptional cases 
(HCSO 2015). The very uneven distribution by profile can be explained by the interplay 
of several, partly independent, factors: traditions of civil engagement, diverse 
institutional compositions, and the specific regulations of the given fields. 
The high number of NGOs (mainly: foundations) in education reflects extreme 
fragmentation. Most of these are foundations adjacent to a given school that mainly 
draw on parental support to contribute to the chronically low financing of the schools 
from state resources. These foundations can be regarded as institutionalisations of the 
old forms of support that parents had provided in work and material contributions back 
already in state-socialist times. The convenience of having an adjacent foundation helps 
a great variety of goals and interests of these educational institutions. Sometimes it is 
used for maintenance and development of school infrastructure; in other cases the 
foundation helps to raise funds for complementing the very low salaries of teachers; yet 
in other cases new and innovative courses are supported or local grants are provided to 
talented students; etc. In sum, these NGOs take over certain tasks from the public sector 
(especially from the local governments and the schools themselves), and this way help 
to compensate for underfinancing while allowing for some flexibility in the otherwise 
often over-bureaucratised workings of schools. A smaller part of the educational 
foundations serves afternoon schooling and ‘catching up’ programmes for the most 
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disadvantaged groups of Roma students. The third type consists of financially stronger 
NGOs that facilitate and finance private and non-public schooling. In recent years, 
church-based foundations have been set up in significant numbers to help the spreading 
of faith-based schools which is a declared goal of the current government. As to 
influence and representation, the latter types of educational foundations have gained 
importance in shaping the curricular and managerial reforms of the sphere. At the same 
time, small school-based NGOs are tacitly acknowledged as ways to circumvent the 
pressing claims for more funds in public education. However, changing policies 
affecting the schemes where these NGOs can apply for funding have induced their 
temporary – sometimes even ultimate – suspension during the past years. 
Although much lower in number than in the realm of education, forming NGOs in 
healthcare is likewise driven to a large extent by the long-pursued public and 
professional interests in compensating for the chronic shortages of state funding in 
healthcare. Again, in a fragmented way, the majority of healthcare foundations function 
as adjacent ‘arms’ of local hospitals and independent outpatient services (Bocz–Kmetty 
2008). These foundations are often initiated by doctors and healthcare managers who 
see the only way to buy new, expensive equipment or to modernise the hospital’s 
laboratories and wards, is by setting up a foundation and opening it to patients’ 
contributions while also utilising these foundations to apply for grants to domestic and 
foreign funding schemes. Sometimes these adjacent NGOs serve to provide 
complementary funding to the severely underpaid medical professionals. 
Another important type of NGO in healthcare serves cooperation between professionals 
and affected patients (sometimes together with relatives) in case of certain diseases. 
Given the high mortality rates in cancer and cardiovascular diseases, the foundations set 
up in these areas in collaboration between doctors and patients have gained wide public 
acknowledgement in providing prevention and counselling. This is reflected in the fact 
that the few nationwide foundations of this type receive the highest share of the one-per 
cent designations of earners’ personal income tax. This enables these few strong 
associations to raise awareness, to train patients, and to contribute to improving the 
quality of cure and care. However, even these widely-acknowledged and financially 
stable associations have practically no influence on policy-making in health care. At the 
same time, most of the organisations with similar profile lack adequate resources and 
representation: they soon become multifunctional units providing training and 
counselling but also fulfilling important advocacy roles; however, despite all their 
efforts, they largely remain restricted to their own small circles of participating patients 
and their supporting health personnel. 
Yet another important type of NGOs is patients’ associations. With a decades-long 
history, one can say that perhaps these are the most genuinely civil initiatives of the 
health field: usually they are called into being by a few active patients who offer support 
to those suffering from the same disease. Support is meant in broad terms and ranges 
from sharing experiences in discussion groups to developing courses and counselling on 
issues of everyday life while coping with a certain illness. In most cases the organisers 
also invite doctors and nurses; the new forms of cooperation between professionals and 
affected patients is usually welcome by both parties.  
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Finally, a fourth type of NGO in health care serves professional goals and largely 
remains closed to broader civil participation: these recently developed foundations aim 
to support medical research and certain professionally defined and closely regulated 
fields of medical experimentation. By utilising the relatively relaxed regulations of the 
civil sphere, these foundations ease the burden of underfinancing by the state, however, 
they certainly lack all other characteristics of the civil sphere.  
The above indicated lack of civil initiatives in housing and employment requires a 
glimpse at the peculiar state and regulations of these two areas. 
Housing is considered in Hungary in highly privatised terms: it is individual families 
and housing coops that are the subjects of the various central and local provisions, while 
these provisions are designed in clear market terms of investment and returns. Social 
housing is practically non-existent; the case of the poor is tackled by targeted support 
schemes that are usually managed by the local governments as parts of their welfare 
programme and are always run on an individual basis. Thus the few civil society 
organisations working in the housing sphere represent the interests of certain vulnerable 
groups but they have little space to respond to the housing needs of their constituents 
(see Svensson, Balogh  and Cartwright 2017)17.   
As to employment, the notion of civil society involvement is even less present than in 
housing. The various programmes and schemes supporting the growth of employment 
target the SME-sector and allocate funding mainly to medium-size private firms. 
Naturally, the criteria are adjusted to the profitability of the business: the goal is to 
invigorate economic growth through creating interest in raising the extent and quality of 
employment. Additionally, a few long-established civil associations representing the 
employment needs of people with various disabilities are partners of the government in 
designing specific regulations for these groups. It is important to note that 
unemployment does not appear among the profiles of nationwide civil society 
organisations: instead, a very fragmented system of local associations tries to support 
the local unemployed by providing training programmes and schemes for learning how 
to adapt to labour market needs. Recently, the emerging social cooperatives – as new 
forms of economic units enjoying certain preferential tax-regulations due to their social 
provisions – have become important new actors in meeting the latter goals. 
                                                 
17 However, the picture about limited civil interest in housing holds for ‘times of peace’; crisis situations may give rise 
to intense civil activities. The financial crisis created a number of organisations, mostly formal, but also informal, 
against the banks and evictions. Many Hungarians got into financial difficulties through having taken loans in foreign 
currency, and as these loans became more expensive after the financial crisis in 2008, they could not pay it back.  
People blamed the banks for misleading on terms and being greedy on interest. The resulting anti-bank movement 
has partially been successful in pressuring the government to do something about the matter, leading to a law that 
mandated banks to convert all loans back to forints on terms unfavourable to the banks.  
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2.3 Structural access of civil society to political decision-making  
As we have seen so far, the new and older civil actors perform a number of important 
tasks in Hungary. They contribute to service delivery and thereby assist meeting the 
needs of a wide variety of people and public institutions; civil society organisations can 
influence local development and modernisation; and these organisations are also 
important in accumulating knowledge, skills and know-how and transferring it to the 
public domain. At the same time, the influence that civil society can exert on political 
decision-making and the shaping of public policy remains rather weak – and this is 
largely due to the one-sidedness of the relationship. While the civil actors are deeply 
embedded into the national policy environment, their functioning is ruled mainly by 
top-down mediation and regulations. It follows from this hierarchical construct that civil 
society access to political decision-making is largely dependent on the way government 
actors shape and determine the policy environment. However, it should be emphasised 
that civil society has few institutionalised access points to decision-makers in the sense 
of being codified in the constitution, law or administrative decisions. By 
institutionalised access points we mean practices observed in both pluralist and 
corporatist long-term democracies, such as hearings (e.g. US) or consultations as 
regular and embedded parts of the policy-making process (e.g. in Sweden, see Lundberg 
2013). While proposed legislation according to the law should be subject to 
consultation18 , either with the general public or stakeholder groups, a study of all 
consultations held between 2011 and 2014 showed that the time period available for this 
generally was a mere 7 days in the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, that sank further to 4 in 
2014 (Alberti et al, 2015: 26). 
This does not mean that representatives of civil society are never included in decision-
making processes in Hungary. They are regularly taking part in the decision-making 
process surrounding the use and distribution of EU funds, although research shows that 
real influence is limited and that procedures are contested (Batory and Cartwright 2011, 
Demidov 2014). One phenomenon which seems to have become very widespread at the 
local government level is the use of ‘civil society round-tables’. Despite their name, 
these ‘round-tables’ are often set up with the purpose of regular usage as consultative 
bodies to the local governments, and can be found across the country. The civil actors 
have more a ‘courtesy role’ than real influence though, even if just witnessing the 
decision-making process, their presence may create some platform for informal 
‘lobbying’.  
The same type of bodies has also been institutionalised at national level in some sectors, 
although that seems of more limited scope and success. An example of the type of 
question and the type of problems that can be encountered is the ‘Anti-segregation 
round-table’, set up by the Hungarian government in 2013 following a request from the 
                                                 
18 CXXX Law on the participation of the community in the preparation of laws (2010)  
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United Nations. After initial cooperation, a number of civil society organisations left the 
round-table in protest against the government’s policy decisions, including the human 
rights organisation Hungarian Helsinki Committee, part of the international Helsinki 
movement.19 An independent expert who left the round-table explained her decision to 
leave on her public Facebook page: 
“I, who always emphasised that I find it so important to build our 
work into the state system, I give up this path <to this>. I often came 
to this point, mainly, because I felt that we so much don’t speak one 
language, that we see things so differently, but I always waited, hoped 
that something would change, and that to some extent I can keep 
things in measures, push the brakes …<…> But I think what 
disturbed me the most was that we had to work out strategies to deal 
with certain consequences that were actually coming out of this very 
system. <…> I will try in some other way. Because as such it doesn’t 
work.” (Nóra Ritók20, our translation) 
These and similar events of conflict point to the complexity of cooperation between the 
national policy-makers and the most articulate civil society organisations that have the 
reputation, the necessary visions, skills and voice to stand up and claim involvement in 
policy-making. The conflict is partly about power and influence but partly also about 
clashes in needs. The civil actors usually argue for acknowledgement and support in 
order to affirm the representation of their target group and meet the needs of their 
clients; the government usually strives to ease the pressure on the public sphere by 
redefining part of it as ‘civil’. As soon the civil actors are ready to accept the 
redefinition, the government finds it justified to tighten its ruling. At this point, a 
political compromise would be needed, but it is rarely achieved. The end result is 
usually a break in the consultations and a frustrated withdrawal driven by feelings of 
betrayal on the part of the civil partners. 
Another option open to the civil society organisations is to refrain from attempts to 
cooperate with the representatives of the public sector. This minimises the possibility of 
conflicts, however, claims on representation and influence are also deliberately given 
up. The outcome is often the marginalisation of the civil society organisation. One of 
the most controversial and destabilising effects of such a deliberate withdrawal is losing 
access to information about funding opportunities and, gradually, losing access also to 
the resources themselves.  
In the next section we show how these complexities and controversies are played out in 
the distribution of financial support to civil society organisations. 
                                                 
19 Articles about this were published in Civilhetes, a magazine produced for civil society, see 
http://civilhetes.net/tiltakozasul-kilepett-a-kormany-altal-letrehozott-kerekasztalbol-az-utolso-civil-szakember-l-ritok-
nora-is <Retrieved May 23, 2017> A local coverage example can be found on the local government page of Gilvanfa 
http://gilvanfa.hu/2017/04/21/kereszttuzben-az-antiszegregacios-kerekasztal-2017-04-21/ <Retrieved May 23, 
2017> . 
20
 See her public Facebook page at: https://www.facebook.com/lritoknora/posts/229836934015221 <Retrieved May 
23, 2017).  
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2.4 Financial support structures and incentives 
Due partly to the relative scarcity of alternative channels of support but justified also by 
the extensive involvement of the civil society organisations in providing a wide range of 
public and social services, the two main actors of financing the NGOs are the 
government and the municipalities that distribute funding through the central state 
budget and the yearly revenue of the local authorities, respectively. Funds for the civil 
society sector consist of two large segments: the redistribution of a part of the yearly 
collected tax-revenue and, since Hungary’s accession to the European Union in 2004, a 
part of the European Structural and Cohesion Funds determined year after year by the 
parliament in the framework of the laws on budget and spending. Over time, the latter 
resource has become more significant both in magnitude and the gradual extension of 
the scope of the schemes that NGOs can apply to. At the same time, decision-making 
about the roles and the revenues of the various schemes and programmes has remained 
in the government’s hands and this way dependence on central allocation has even 
strengthened. Frequent modifications to the rules of access and the fluctuation of the 
magnitude of funding cause some instability in the workings of the NGOs: when 
severely underfunded, many of them need to temporarily suspend their operations 
which results in the oscillation of their ability to provide services. Such symptoms of 
irregular functioning primarily hit the smaller NGOs with sometimes dramatic 
consequences for service delivery in the poorest communities. 
Parallel to the growth and diversification of the NGOs both by size and activities, the 
regulations on support and the financial obligations of the various clusters of 
organisations have been refined. The most important step was the introduction of the 
concept of ‘public benefit organisation’ in 1997. According to the rules, an NGO can 
apply for acquiring this status if it has been engaged at least for two years in one or 
more activities that can be acknowledged by the court as ‘publicly beneficial’. The long 
list of the activities is largely in concordance with the content that the notion of ‘public 
and social services’ covers. Public benefit organisations enjoy tax reductions, relaxed 
rules in engaging in profit-generating economic activities and extra support with regard 
to employment. At the same time, both private and business donors offering support to 
this type of NGOs can deduct the contribution from their tax-fund. As long as their 
profile makes it possible, NGOs apply for this preferential status: at present, close to 
half of the civil society organisations are designated as such. The organisations are 
under strict control of the court: ceasing or suspension of their ‘publicly beneficial’ 
activities implies the withdrawal of the status. 
Although the ‘publicly beneficial’ status involves extra advantages, the whole of the 
NGO sphere enjoys some privileges. Civil society organisations are exempt from 
paying a wide range of business-related taxes; their contribution to employment is 
acknowledged by special (lowered) rates in taxation and social security contribution; 
they enjoy exemptions and/or reductions in paying VAT after the sales of their services 
and products; and they can expect tax-return in cases when income of the preceding 
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year was used for extending their primary registered activities. As already mentioned, a 
special form of financing the civil society organisations is provided through the so-
called 1 per cent rule that was introduced in 1996. The regulation has met growing 
popularity: currently some 45 per cent of the tax-payers choose to designate 1 per cent 
of their yearly personal income tax. Most of the offers are made for schools and cultural 
centres, but welfare services and NGOs in healthcare also appear among the popular 
choices. The transferred 1 per cent significantly raises the revenue of the civil sphere: 
some three per cent of their funding comes from this source. It is perhaps even more 
important that citizens can directly influence the potential development of the sector. 
The priorities that the individual offers highlight can be considered reliable information 
about country-wide developmental needs, and can be perceived as popular ‘votes’ that 
extend democratic participation in public affairs. Public authorities - the central 
government and the municipalities - can acknowledge this focus in their planning and 
actions.  
While the above described forms of financing are in accordance with the customary 
regulations that Western societies apply, the state of public procurement is rather 
underdeveloped. NGOs rarely get support from the municipalities in the form of 
endowments. Instead of classic procurement concluding in take-over of properties for 
replacing the municipality’s certain service provisions, more frequent forms are leasing 
or renting for a definite period of time that the parties set up as part of their contract. 
The motives behind the prevalence of these transient forms are complex: due to decades 
of neglect, local infrastructure is still in poor shape in many of the localities, thus, the 
new actors are often unwilling to make use of them. The intermingling of the public and 
civil sides in running a range of local social services makes it rational to keep the 
venues as municipal properties; in addition, frequent fluctuation in the financing and the 
ability of service provision of these NGOs (especially the smaller ones) makes it risky 
for the local authorities to transfer ownership of public facilities. The civil society 
organisations are also often reluctant to take over property due to the financial 
obligations that they are unsure to be able to meet. At the same time, the strict rules of 
capitalising on property adds a further aspect to the limitations on organisational and 
financial autonomy of the civil sphere. In addition to the financing of their activities, the 
overwhelming majority of NGOs is dependent on the will of the central and local 
governments as expressed in frequently changing regulations and recently emerged 
restrictions.   
In sum, the financial and infrastructural sides of daily operations of the civil society 
organisations are characterised by multifaceted uncertainties that mainly follow from 
the constraints of the sphere’s relationship with the central and local administrations. 
These uncertainties and instabilities could be overcome by more regularity in the 
transfer of funds (both domestic and foreign) and by giving greater scope to normalised 
indices of measuring as much the organisational needs as the outcomes. However, the 
establishment of such norms currently meets insurmountable difficulties. As it was 
pointed out earlier, the uncertainties that characterise the SME-sector and, to a certain 
extent, also the larger enterprises exert direct impact on the civil society organisations 
through the oscillations in direct and indirect financing. Additionally, the suspicious 
attitude of the public authorities toward the civil sphere has led to questioning also the 
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justified spending of a substantial number of NGOs. Thus, the mere existence of civil 
society organisations depends on two large aspects/forces out of their control: the state 
of the economy, and the ideological-political orientation of the government and other 
important political actors. 
 
3 The policy environment of the social economy and social innovation  
 
The preceding chapters have shown that there are some economic and political 
opportunities for civil society organisations to have policy impact, but that these 
opportunities are limited in scope, and have become increasingly so, especially on 
central level. Social impact can of course be reached without cooperation with the 
government at its different levels, but lack of dialogue or low-quality dialogue, hinders 
policy learning, policy transfer and policy up-scaling. Thus, impact usually becomes 
local also in the sense of being restricted to those directly affected.  
The question of whether the social economy and actors therein are recognised by policy 
makers does not readily assume a sequence of events in which the social economy and 
its actors first emerge, and then ‘receive’ recognition. To this question, one could argue 
that policy-makers were late in formally recognising the value of the social economy, 
since for instance the special legal form ‘social cooperative’ was only created through 
legislation in 2006. In that way policy-makers recognised ongoing activities dating back 
at least a decade, and decided to provide a space for that. 
On the other hand, one can make an equally strong argument that recognition by policy- 
makers is in the case of Hungary something that partly precedes the creation of 
institutionalised forms of social economy actors (especially social cooperatives). 
Because of the willingness of the Hungarian policy-makers to adhere to European 
discourses of the value of the social economy, an institutionalised legal form for this has 
been pushed as one of the preferred modes to disburse EU funds. This has led to the 
creation of a fairly large number of social cooperatives, many of which are shown as 
inactive when researchers have tried to approach them to assess their scope and 
activities. As discussed above, the research projects cited in this report all faced 
problems of actually finding associations that are listed, eliciting response either via 
mail or phone, and identifying ongoing activities in cases when contact was made. That 
is not to say that there are not many social cooperatives carrying out serious and 
substantial work in their areas. However, the sector, as the overall civil society sector, is 
vulnerable to competing narratives and competing interpretations of their practical 
value: the instrumental perspective of the social economy for the sake of job creation 
versus the social economy as a democratising force and promoter of labour done with 
other purpose than monetary gain. Therefore, social economy acts and actors do receive 
recognition expressed in policy strategies and enacted policies, but the focus on 
supporting the creation of social economy actors (e.g. cooperatives) rather than on acts, 
mean that the time sequence between social economy acts and recognition is not one-
way and linear, but rather two-way or circular. The importance of social economy actors 
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is recognised in official discourse within a certain narrative before it has achieved much 
that can be actually measured, but the support does lead to some action that fits more or 
less well with established civil society practices.  
The idea of ‘social innovation’ occupies a marginal position in Hungarian policy 
thinking and the concept is practically missing from the regulatory arsenal of public 
policies (Edmiston 2015). It is mainly applied in external relations: in their accounts 
about the various activities and regulations for reporting to the European Commission, 
the Hungarian authorities engage in a translational work by fitting domestic 
developments into the terminology that is applied by the European Union. The 
conceptual uncertainties and confusions arise mainly from the above described 
intermingling of the public and the civil spheres in the delivery of a wide range of social 
and public services that is then further complicated by the mixing in finances and 
decision-making. This situation explains why ‘social innovations’ – and especially the 
‘social economy’ as their field of operation – embrace a wide range of public social 
services (regardless of the organisational and financial forms of their manoeuvring), but 
also denote the civil society organisations that are active service providers in socially 
sensitive domains, and, additionally, incorporates the activities undertaken as social 
responsibilities by enterprises and other for-profit institutions. This means that one faces 
great difficulties when describing the state of social innovation in Hungary: on the one 
hand, it hardly exists, on the other hand, it represents a vivid and dedicated sphere of 
actors and activities.  
The most fruitful approach for sorting out the agents, activities, and policies that 
embody social innovation is to look at the regulatory field by considering those 
administrative and financial measures that help the work of economic and non-
economic organisations in meeting certain social needs. By definition, a large number 
of civil society organisations in the areas of education, welfare, culture, and health 
represent a degree of social innovation. This is acknowledged by the tax-regulations 
applied to them that define lower margins and reduced rates of contribution by reference 
to their specific areas of action. Social innovation as added value is acknowledged by 
registering some half of these organisations as units producing public benefit – a 
category that is, as said above, awarded by the court and that involves further reductions 
of the organisation’s financial obligations. At the same time, the status is not awarded 
forever: the yearly reports of the organisation are the bases of reinforcement or 
suspension. This is meant as an incentive and serves also the dynamism of the sphere.  
A further domain of social innovations involves those enterprises that aim to find viable 
compromises between market adaptation and the pure motive of maximising their 
profit, on the one hand, and the fulfilment of certain social or welfare goals, on the 
other: they contract people with disabilities, or engage in employing a pre-defined 
number of Roma applicants, or agree to take on a large share of the work towards 
reducing of local unemployment, or contribute to community development in the 
settlement where they function, etc. These enterprises (usually of small or medium size) 
get governmental and local support from one of the schemes under the European 
Strategic Funds and enjoy relaxed taxation requirements. Similar in their mission are the 
Social Responsibility Plans of the larger domestic and foreign enterprises that express 
entrepreneurial engagement in meeting a wide range of educational and welfare goals. 
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Although these enterprises do not enjoy tax-reduction or -exemption, sensitivity as 
expressed in addressing certain burning social issues (poverty, unemployment and 
discrimination) in their Social Responsibility Plan contributes to their prestige and 
usually pays also in improved positions in negotiations with the government or the 
professional bodies in authority. A novelty and true innovation is represented by the 
social cooperatives. This new form on the margin of economy and welfare was 
introduced in 1996 with some important additions to the law on general cooperatives. 
Following the rising interests, legislation in 2006 set the framework and the ways of 
functioning of the social cooperative as a type of self-regulatory organisations to meet 
the welfare needs in given – mostly rural – communities. Important special tax-
regulations guarantee their particular economic status, while production and competitive 
participation on the market have been assisted by special governmental grants. 
Although due to the lack of regular data collection, it is hard to know the exact number 
of the active social cooperatives, experts agree that their number is around 100 to which 
one has to add those ‘classic’ cooperatives that, beside production and trading, 
accomplish important social and welfare goals. While the economic contribution of 
these social and ‘socially imbued’ cooperatives is modest, their exemplar and teaching 
functions are important. They represent a new form of non-hierarchical decision-making 
that is based on equal rights and equal power of the participants and that convincingly 
demonstrates an efficient new way of tackling important social problems (poverty, 
ethnic discrimination, drug use, etc.) with full devotion and, at the same time, to the 
benefit of the larger community. 
Similar learning and teaching functions are important constituents of social innovation 
in its broader contexts as well. Although the lack of clear conceptualisation and 
properly outlined strategic plans makes it difficult to truly assess the spreading of 
innovative practices and materialised innovations, the idea has gradually entered into 
the public sphere, and it has become a customary aspect of formalising cooperation 
between the public and civil service providers ranging from education to healthcare and 
to welfare. As to the public attitude, the perception of civil society actors has altered, 
and earlier suspicion toward all institutions outside of the governmental sphere has been 
shed. As it is demonstrated by the yearly increase of the number of NGOs and a 
growing intensity of professionalisation from the mid-1990s onwards, civil society 
organisations have become an embedded new segment of Hungarian society and 
economy (HCSO 2015). Such a development enabled true cooperation with an 
increased sensitivity toward a wide range of social problems that had been brought to 
the table by independent civil actors. The positive turn of public attitudes toward civil 
society organisations has led to the development of a more supportive legal, 
administrative, and financial framework that began to incentivise the enlargement of the 
sphere. In this sense the innovative ideas have imbued also the domain of national and 
local governance that have incorporated into their policies the ever more customary 
partnership with the civil sphere. However, this welcome partnership also has a 
dangerous implication: by shifting tasks to the NGOs, low financing and a certain 
degree of neglect have become tacitly accepted and, in the name of efficient 
cooperation, the public authorities nowadays often feel ‘liberated’ from investing into 
the development of social services. This latter issue calls attention to the necessity of 
clearly identifying the boundaries between the public and the civil spheres and points 
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toward the need for developing a coherent policy of social innovation with particular 
emphasis on the separation of governmental and civil tasks and duties in the respective 
areas. 
Based on the review of the literature and studies of the social economy in Hungary 
referred to above, and in conjunction with previous sections and chapters in this 
working paper, we conclude that a claim that there is an ‘emerging social and solidarity 
movement’ in Hungary could be substantiated, but it would be with the following notes: 
Firstly, ‘emergence’ must be situated in relation to layers of practices embedded in 
different historical times. In order to understand the current landscape, it is important to 
understand that practices of economic behaviour based on reciprocity and redistribution, 
i.e. the foundation for the social and solidarity economy, have a long history in 
Hungary, and can be found in both planning and market economic systems. That said, 
more recent history also matters. The discourse around the ‘social economy’ and the 
role of ‘social enterprises’ in ‘revitalising the economy’ in international forums, 
including the European Union, over the past two and a half decades, has given impetus 
to the creation of specific legislation and policy frameworks.  
Secondly, the aim of the legislation and the policy frameworks has been to make social 
economy type activities stemming from civil society visible, regulated and targets of 
specific support. We assess that overall the creation of the ‘social cooperative’ legal 
form has had positive effects in all these three respects characterising the social 
economy (visibility, oversight, funding) and has led to an increase in terms of size and 
scope of activity. There are, however, unintended and/or negative effects as well: a) the 
focus on the form rather than on the content risks overlooking the systemic changes that 
would be required by a transition to large-scale social and solidarity economy; b) the 
creation and support of a specific form has led to a focus on the instrumentality of the 
solidarity economy as a creator of job rather than as an enabler of other values, such as 
democratic principles; c) attention paid to the form sometimes creates sentiments of 
entitlement from the state (or the EU), and expectations on funding that is rarely fully 
fulfilled; d) as the rest of civil society, social cooperatives and other actors in the social 
economy are vulnerable to the effects of politicisation, or perceived politicisation21, of 
civil society.  
Future research on the various acts and actors that may be lumped together as a ‘social 
and solidarity movement’ would need to take these dimensions into account as well, if a 
holistic picture is to be provided.  
 
 
                                                 
21 Politicisation here refers to closeness to party politics rather than advocacy for certain agendas (Kövér 
2016).  
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4 Conclusion   
This paper provided an overview of the ambiguities that are surrounding civil society in 
Hungary with the aim to assess the potential of the civil society impact to spur the 
growth of a solidarity-based social economy through its own activities and policy 
influence.  
The discussion took departure from showing that civil society as manifested through the 
creation and activities of non-governmental organisations is an important constituent of 
the Hungarian public domain, but it has not become an integral part of the 
institutionalisation of everyday democratic participation. This is especially true for the 
national government level, whereas more progress has been made by local governments 
in terms of setting up and implementing strategic approaches to and with civil society 
actors.  
The strength of civil society lies primarily in the increasing number of its organisations 
and the breadth of activities, whereas lack of resources, blurred lines between public 
and private, and the manifold aspects of polarisation point to its vulnerability. The paper 
attempted to highlight that both strengths and vulnerabilities of the Hungarian civil 
society infrastructure can be traced back to developments during the socialist era as well 
as to economic and political influences from within and outside of the country during 
the transition years and afterwards. The discussion revealed that influence of the 
European Union has intensified since Hungary’s accession in 2004, and that EU-level 
policies and directives often provided blueprints for regulations and also effective 
practical help concerning the functioning of the domestic civil actors and the 
cooperating public institutions as well.  
At the same time, a process of politicisation or perceived politicisation has taken place 
alongside emerging normative debates on the value of civil society (Kövér 2016). The 
notion that a ‘vibrant’ and ‘independent’ civil society is closely intertwined with 
positive long-term democratic development has been a dominating norm in the Eastern 
European Union countries since the democratic transition in the early 1990s. In the 
words of Guess and Abrams, they were “viewed as an indispensable component of a 
healthy, functioning, modern democracy” (2005:1), and scholarly and practitioner 
efforts went into categorising how and what could be done to promote them (Harsányi 
1998, Reisinger 2010). Celebration of the civil sphere is fuelled also by earlier 
experience: under state-socialism, forming associations and conducting informal actions 
for fulfilling needs that the formal domains of production were unable to meet counted 
as ‘oppositional’ activities and could imply punishments of all kinds. Liberation from 
such a pressure and the formal acceptance of the civil sphere brought about widely 
shared feelings of freedom and self-determination. However, in Hungary, as elsewhere 
in Central and Eastern Europe, the story of the last 25 years is complicated. The concept 
‘civil society’ has become widely known, to the point that people who are engaged in 
various public good associations often refer to themselves as ‘civilek’, with 
connotations of benevolence, altruism and creation of public goods. At the same time, 
‘civil society’ has been criticised for running the errands of foreign powers or being 
political agents in disguise. The latter has been expressed by Prime Minister Viktor 
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Orbán, for instance in an outline of his party’s ideology in a well-known speech held in 
Tusnádfürdő in Romania in 2014. 22  Therefore, while the numbers of civil society 
organisations may have looked impressive, it was clear to anyone observing or 
interacting with these that the figures hid some structural features that would undermine 
its long-term democratic consolidation. 
First, it is important to know that many so-called civil society organisations were 
closely linked to public institutions. In small settlements, they often would be set up by 
those who were already politically active (such as the mayor or local government 
council members). In cities and towns associations and foundations would be 
established with the purpose of supporting a single public institution, such as a school 
or a hospital, often de facto run by people employed by these institutions or heading 
them, and the main function would be to create alternative ways of making up for 
shortfall of public financing. Therefore, it is questionable whether a sharp line of 
demarcation can be drawn between these supposedly ‘civil’ institutions and ‘public’ 
institutions.  
Secondly, many civil society organisations involved in producing various types of 
public benefits came to develop allegiances with one side of what was in the 2000s a 
rapidly polarising Hungarian political landscape. Therefore, they came to be seen by 
some not as independent from the ‘state’, but as associated either with the ‘government’ 
(whichever party was in power), or with the ‘opposition’. Depending on where one 
stands, certain NGOs would fit in what has recently been called GONGOS 
(Government-sponsored Non-Governmental organisations23), though this is not specific 
to only civil society. Research by Vedres and Stark shows that the governance of 
business companies also has been heavily structured along political lines (Stark and 
Vedres 2012).  
In addition, financial sustainability has been a constant challenge. International funds 
became scarcer in the 2000s, and for many civil society organisations the national or EU 
funds were insufficient to replace that shortfall. However, we would argue that it is the 
two factors listed above that were most important in the failure to create a governance 
system where civil society actors would be trusted partners in policy-making while 
retaining their intellectual, financial and organisational autonomy. Some mechanisms 
for consultations were put in place, but instead of consolidating these have been 
hollowed out to the point of open conflict between the government and parts of civil 
                                                 
22 A translation of the speech is available in English: “Ideally a civil politician, as opposed to professional, is 
an individual who is organizing from the bottom up, financially independent, and the nature of his work is 
voluntary. If we look at civil organisations in Hungary, the ones in the public eye, debates concerning the 
Norwegian Fund have brought this to the surface, then what I will see is that we have to deal with paid 
political activists here. And these political activists are, moreover, political activists paid by foreigners.” 
http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-
26-july-2014/10592  // A video of the speech with English subtitles is available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mHxg3Aoir6w <retrieved May 17, 2017>.  
23 See Moises Naim. 2009. What Is a GONGO? How government-sponsored groups masquerade as civil 
society. Foreign Policy. October 13, 2009. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/13/what-is-a-
gongo/ The applicability of the term for the Hungarian case was recently pointed out by Eva Balogh, analyst 
of Hungarian affairs at the blog Hungarian Spectrum, see post at 
http://hungarianspectrum.org/2017/05/13/fideszs-very-own-ngos-stuffed-with-public-money/  
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society, leading to public protests and demonstrations in spring 2017.24 We want to 
emphasise that this is indeed about ‘part of’ civil society. There is no united ‘civil 
society resistance’ against the ‘state’ or ‘unitary civil society’, due to the intersection 
between the civil and the public, and the varying political affiliations elaborated above.   
At the same time, development of the Hungarian civil sector is still slow in terms of 
incorporating the concepts and measures of the European-level discourse, policies and 
actions. Due to this, the notion of the ‘social economy’, that has increasingly become a 
leading concept of the democratic discourse in the West, is primarily seen by those in 
power as a foreign import and is associated with activities carried out exclusively by 
non-governmental organisations in separation from institutions of the public sphere. In 
addition, varied forms of cooperation can be observed in the name of ‘social 
partnership’. As such, these are characterised by enabling and constraining factors 
similar in nature to the entirety of the civil sphere. As compared, the term ‘solidarity 
economy’ is less known as a set of productive activities that can be part of co-designing 
public services and providing them through joint actions of civil and local governmental 
entities. However, one can assume that with spreading knowledge and practices it will 
grow in size and importance. The increasing number of ‘regular’ cooperatives and firms 
taking up important social and solidaristic goals and activities seems to point in this 
direction. 
A closer look at the roles and functions of the civil society actors in the selected areas of 
education, employment, housing and health exemplified the range of actions and 
public/civil cooperation formats while underscoring the ambiguities. Of course, civil 
associations and foundations exist in all four spheres, but their creation followed rather 
spontaneous developments motivated mainly by institutional needs and interests in the 
diverse public service areas. As we saw, the civil initiatives usually emerged in a search 
for expanding service delivery and, often more importantly, to provide solutions for 
reducing the constraints that their public institution partner faces. However, regardless 
of their specific professional profile, the foundations and associations in question tend 
to lose independence and easily come into a subordinated position.  
Repeated threats to independence and dangers to become subordinated to tightened 
administrative control dangers of a subordinate status call for a few more general 
comments about the difficulties and uncertainties of the civil sphere. 
As widely noted in the recent political science literature on the democratic potentials of 
social and political participation, the state of civil society is a sensitive measure of the 
qualities of democracy in a country (for an overview, see Warren 2012). Civil 
organisations are, of course, just part of the broader landscape, nevertheless their status, 
recognition and embeddedness into the realm of the complexity of power, 
representation and influence seem to be good indicators of the prevalence of democratic 
                                                 
24 Pablo Gorondi, Tens of thousands protest Hungary's education, NGO policies. Associated Press Apr 12, 
2017.  See http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/hungary-thousands-protest-govts-education-
ngo-policies-46755250 (retrieved April 24, 2017).  
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conditions in society and they carry the potential of showing the strength and 
weaknesses of these relations.  
Taken from this perspective, the above outlined controversies and constraints indicate a 
rather weak embeddedness, relatively high reputation and trust, and constant fluctuation 
in the status of the civil society organisations. At a closer look, the most problematic 
aspect of their operation is a low degree of incorporation in both the institutional 
environment and in politics and policy-making. This implies that, provided it is 
politically reasoned by those in power, the mere existence of an organisation can be 
questioned and, in extreme conditions, the organisation as such can even disappear. But 
embeddedness would also require some stability in the conditions these organisations 
need to function, and in their modus operandi. Again, as we saw in the above 
discussion, the prevailing state of affairs point toward weaknesses also in these regards.  
On the one hand, these deficiencies reflect the relatively short history of civil society 
with even shorter history of its organisations in Hungary. After all, stabilisation of the 
sphere and its secured embeddedness into the democratic polity need years and decades 
of social experimentation, accumulation of knowledge and the expansion of functional 
networks and social capital. On the other hand, the 30-year-long history of the domain 
of civil society organisations shows that the majority of Hungarian NGOs have 
functioned with institutional and financial dependence on the public authorities, and that 
such a state of affairs seriously hindered their engagement in the genuinely civil 
activities of advocacy and community organising. The 2010 reorientation of the 
country’s political arrangement toward an ‘illiberal democracy’ has accentuated these 
alarming tendencies: it has implied openly turning away from the involvement of the 
civil actors in politics and policy-making. Some worsening indicators of declining 
numbers, severe lack of funding and a fraying framework of incorporating NGOs into 
certain local and national-level arrangements of power-sharing point toward a sharp 
turn-around in Hungary’s civil society developments. Despite the advantages a powerful 
civil sphere would have, current political trends undermine its potentials.  
It would be an exaggeration to state that the current government is entirely hostile 
toward the civil sphere. Rather, its intention is to keep the civil society organisations 
under strict political, financial and administrative control: still propping them up but 
restricting their independence at every turn. Maybe such positioning is perceived by the 
ruling power as the launching of a ‘new variation of democracy’. However, our analysis 
shows that the intended restrictions included in the initial master-plan do not 
automatically stop at a pre-designed level. Instead, decline has a tendency to accelerate. 
So the current trends do not seem to signal the build-up of a new variant of democratic 
entities, but point toward a demise of the entire sphere.  
Given the deeply rooted weaknesses of Hungarian civil society and the uncertainties 
characterising its status and influence, the current rejection of the values and safeguards 
of liberal democracy might easily produce distortions in the sector that later 
interventions may find impossible to cure, reconstruct, and ultimately restore. 
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